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Heidegger claims that truth is a revealing that is concomitant with 
concealing, and thus, the nature oftruth is "untruth." In art, and specifically 
in painting. truth in its fun essence is "won" through the simultaneous 
presentation to the observer ofa revealing and a concealing. For Heidegger, 
this simultaneous revealing and concealing occurs when the "world" of a 
painting is revealed through a self-concealing medium. Photography is 
another form of revealing through a self-concealing medium, and thus it 
meets Heidegger's standards as a work of art.1 In addition. photography 
seems to meet more effectively than painting Heidegger's characterization 
of a work of art, and one can argue on this basis that photography has 
rendered painting archaic and outdated as means for attaining truth in the 
Heideggerlan sense. Contrary to this argument, Michael Zimmerman claims 
that Heidegger condemns photography as a false and anthropocentric means 
of representation. Heldegger's condemnation, however, fails to conceive 
the. nature of photography in light of Heidegger's own philosophy of 
technology, and when photography is examined in such a light, this 
condemnation of photography appears misleading. 
Truth and Art 
Truth in Heidegger's philosophy is unconcealedness. and Heideg­
ger likens truth to a kind oflighting by which beings are revealed. With each 
being that is revealed, however, another being is concealed. As Heidegger 
states, "Concealment. .. occurs within what it lighted. One being places 
itself in front of another being, the one helps to hide another. the former 
obscures the latter" (OW A, p. 175), Because truth is revealing, and because 
all revealing involves a conceaJing, Hcidegger claims that "[trufu] in its 
essence, is un-truth" (OWA, p, 176), Heldegger further illustrates the 
essence of truth as a "primal strife" in which beings reveal and conceal 
I It sbould be noted that here and throughout the paper, I will be using the term 
"photograpby" to mean "representational photography." !realize that with advancements in 
the technology of film development, one can create very abstract photos that bear very little 
semblance to reality. " 
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themselves. It is through the representation ofthis "primal strife" that truth 
can "happen" or be "won,.' and inhis essay entitled "The Origin ofthe Work 
ofArt," Heidegger demonstrates how such a representation is possible in art. 
In setting out his argument in the essay, Heidegger first considers 
art's "thingly" nature. He asserts that because there is no one human 
interpretation of the nature of things that is applicable to art, the "thingl y" 
character of an artwork should be viewed as indeterminate. In order to 
understand the "thingly" nature of a work of art, Heidegger believes that aU 
traditional interpretations ofthe nature ofthings should be held in abeyance 
in favor of an investigation that examines the "Being of beings." Such an 
investigation should examine art merely as it presents itself and focus on 
what Heidegger calls "[art] work's worldy nature" (OWA, p. 166). Only 
through such an investigation can one discover the essence of art, and when 
this essence is understood, one may then return to the question of the 
undetermined, "thingly" nature of art. 1be investigation ofthe essence of art 
must therefore presuppose that the nature of things is indeterminate. 
After making this presupposition, Heidegger begins expl aining the 
way that art "works" by introducing the concepts ofworld and earth. World 
corresponds to revealing, and a world is the social and historical realm of 
reality that is revealed by a work of art. The world of an art work creates in 
the mind of the observer a broad range of possible decisions and scenarios 
in what Heidegger calls uthe destiny of a historical people" (OWA, p. 172). 
Though world is non-objective, it defines the very being in which we 
conceive the objects of a work of art to exist. 
Earth, on the other hand, corresponds to concealing and is what 
Heidegger calls "that which rises up as self-closing" (OW A, p. 177). Though 
Heideggerdoesnotexplicltlylinktheindeterminateconceptof"thingUncss" 
with the idea of a self-concealing earth, Sandra Lee Bartky argues that 
Heldegger's confusing language hides a subtle yet crucialllnk betwccn the 
two concepts. Bartky claims that just as the nature ofa thing is indeterminate, 
the earth is self-concealing and ambiguous. The nature ofearth,like that of 
all things, can not be fully defined either as a Scientifically allalyzablc 
substance or as a useful piece ofequipment (Bartky. p. 260). As Heidegger 
states, earth is neither "a mass of matter deposited somewhere [nor] the 
merely astronomical idea of planet" (OWA, p. 167). Bartky believes that 
Heldegger is indirectly yet primarily concerned with the thingly aspect of a 
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work of art when he refers to earth in "The Origin of the Work of Art." In 
addition. as Bartky notes, the concept of earth both encompasses and 
supersedes the concept ofthingliness. Thingliness. whose nature is indeter­
minate or concealed, is merely a part of "earth," which is ultimately the 
larger concept of a "sheltering agent" or the self-concealing of Being in 
general (OW A. p. 169). Itdoes seem that Bartky is correct in thinking that 
Heidegger conceives of a subtle yet crucial link between the concepts of 
thingliness and earth simply because when one keeps this link in mind, 
Heidegger's argument about the nature of art is much easier to understand. 
For Heidegger, art is the simultaneous representation of the two 
diametrically opposed forces of world and earth. World is presented in any 
true work of art, and he states that "[to] be a work of art is to set up a world" 
(OWA. p. 178). The world, however, can only be set up for the observer 
through some klnd of medium or thing such as the pigments and colors of 
a painting or the stone of a statue. When a thing is "examined" or analyzed 
on its own, it is, like all other "things," undetermined and self-concealing. 
Heidegger believes that a thing reveals its true nature only when all 
preconceptions ofthingUness are dropped and one experiences the thing by 
"lettingitBe." Such a "letting Be" is accomplished in art simp1y because the 
medium or "thingliness" of the art work is not analyzed by the observer. To 
use Heidegger's example of the Greek temple, the rock which serves as the 
material or "thingUness" of the temple, when analyzed on its own is seen as 
equipment which can be used. Viewedinthis manner, therock, as Heidegger 
states, "disappears into usefulness" (OWA, p. 171). But it is precisely in a 
work of art, such as the Greek temple, that the rock is not viewed as a piece 
of equipment. Rather, in the Greek temple, the rock is left to Be, and its true 
nature, "the massi veness and heaviness of stone," is revealed to the observer . 
Similarly, in a painting the true nature of color "comes to shine forth." The 
colors of a painting are not analyzed but rather simply present themselves 
frcc from human interpretation by creating the image of the painting in the 
mind ofthe observer. Heidegger's argument is somewhat weaker in the case 
of painting in that the medium of color, unlike the stone of a statue, is not a 
piece of equipment and arguably not even a "thing" at all. The important 
point, however, is that though an image is created by the various colors in 
a painting, the colors themselves do not occupy the observer's conscious­
ness. They are simply experienced and laidbare to the observer in their true, 
unadulterated nature. 
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Keeping Bartky' s linking of earth and medium in mind, one can see 
the larger process of self-concealment, or "earth," as being "set forth" and 
revealed to the observer in a work of art. As Heidegger claims, "In setting 
up a world, the work [of art] sets forth the earth" (OWA,p. 171). World and 
earth, though diametrically opposed in their essences, are thus inextricably 
linkedina work ofart, and as Heidegger states, "World and earth. " are never 
separated. The world grounds itself in the earth, and earth juts through 
world" (OW A, p. 172). Heidegger refers to the opposition of the natures of 
world and earth as strife and believes that by simultaneously "setting up a 
world and setting forth the earth," a work of art instigates this strife (OW A, 
p.173). 
For Heidegger, truth is "won" by a work of art through the 
instigation ofthis strife in that truth in its full sense, as both a revealing and 
a concealing, is simultaneously presented to the observer. In a work of art, 
not only is a world revealed to the observer, but the self-concealing earth is 
revealed as well. Thus, as Heidegger states, in a work ofart, because "beings 
as a whole are brought into unconcealedness and held therein, ... the 
unconcealedness ofbeings as a whole, or truth, is won" (OWA, p. 177). As 
Bartky very eloquently explains, "The struggle of world and earth, of 
expression and materials, in the artwork is one way in which the revealing 
but simul taneously concealing World-event may occur" (Bartky, p. 267). To 
use an example, an image is revealed to the observer of a painting. This 
revealing occurs, however, onI y through the observation ofthe colors ofthe 
painting. But in experiencing the painting and realizing its image, the 
observer is unaware ofthe colors themselves. The colors, though presented 
to and experienced by the observer, are concealed to the observer's con­
sciousness. Thus, in seeing the image of a painting, the observer simulta­
neouslyexperiences a revealing and a concealing. Through this experienc­
ing of a revealing and a concealing, truth is not necessarily intellectually 
comprehended, but rather, as Heidegger states, truth simply "happens." 
Art And Photography 
In photography, a simultaneous revealing of a world and setting 
forth ofa self-concealing earth also occurs. A photograph reveals a historical 
and social world and in so doing presents the observer with the realm of 
possible beings and decisions of a particular historical epoch. In Dorothea 
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Lange's famous photograph entitled "California," a world is revealed to the 
observer (pollack, p. 352). The photograph reveals the world ofthe migrant 
fanners in California during the Great Depression in all of its despair and 
hopelessness. The power ofthe photograph lies in its ability to transport the 
observer into the world of the migrant workers and reveal the realm of that 
particular historical epoch in all of its possible beings and decisions. This 
revealing of a world, like painting, is also grounded in the medium ofcolor.2 
Like the experiencing of the image in a painting, the observer of a photo­
graph is unconscious of the colors that comprise the image. The colors of a 
photograph, though experienced, are self-concealing. Thus, photography, 
like painting, reveals a world by setting forth the self-concealing earth, and 
truth "happens" in the Heideggerian sense of the term. 
Not only does truth "happen" in photography, but it happens in a 
much more effective way than it does in painting. Upon close examination, 
the medium rather than the image of a painting can dominate one's 
concentration. When one stands very close to a painting, one notices the 
cracks due to age or the brush strokes that the painter used, and suddenly the 
colors that comprise the image can occupy one's mind. In examining a 
painting in such a way, the image created by tlle painting slips into oblivion, 
and tlle world created by the painting is transformed in the mind of the 
observer into merely an array of various pigments meshed together on a 
cloth canvas. The painting simply becomes a self-concealing thing, no 
different in nature from the self-concealing frame which surrounds it or the 
self-concealing wall upon which it hangs. The world of the painting 
disappears and thus the fragile strife between world and earth is broken. 
When viewing a photograph, however, while the possibility of 
breaking the strife between world and earth cannot be denied, the strife is 
much more difficult to break. Upon close examination, the photograph 
remains an image and the world revealed by the photograph is not lost. The 
fact that the image is merely an array ofdots on photographic paper is almost 
impossible to observe from simply looking at the photograph, and the 
photograph stubbornly refuses to be seen as anything but the image itself. 
This stubbornness ofthe photograph is what one refers to when claiming that 
a photograph is "realistic." The strife between world and earth is so acutely 
21 am not using the word "color" here to mean the opposite of black and white but rather 
simply to mean a visual sensation of some shade of any color including black and white. 
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captured by the photograph that the untangling ofthis strife through careful 
observation becomes almost impossible. It is true that one could break the 
strife by closely observing a photograph through a magnifying glass and 
thus uncovering the medium underlying the image. However, much more 
effort is needed to break the strife ofa photograph than that ofa painting. An 
almost conscious determination to unravel the strife of the photograph is 
required. Because of this fact, photography is much more effective than 
painting in its ability to maintain the strife that for Heidegger is so necessary 
in order for truth to "happen." In this sense, photography is a higher or more 
advanced form of art than painting. 
One might object to this claim by arguing that a photograph, unlike 
a painting, lacks the ability to reveal an object's "equipmental" nature and 
thus remains inferior to painting. This objection might stem from Heidegger' s 
claim that the act of imagining or seeing an actual object can in no way 
capture what he calls the "equipmental being of the equipment." Heidegger 
believes, however, that by observing a painting such as Van Gogh's 
depiction of a pair ofpeasant's shoes, one can come to experience the full 
equipmental being of an object in its myriad of uses. Heidegger describes 
Van Gogh's peasant's shoes as follows: 
From the dark opening ofthe worn insides ofthe shoes the 
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly 
rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated 
tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and 
ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by raw wind. On 
the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under 
the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening 
falls (OWA, p. 163). 
Thus, in his depiction of the shoes, Van Gogh's creative freedom allows him 
to emphasize or add certain qualities of the shoes and thus reveal their full 
equipmental being in a way that would be impossible by simply presenting 
the observer with an actual pair of peasant's shoes. By claiming that 
photographs are mirror images or copies of actual objects, one could thus 
conclude that photographs, like the objects themselves, cannot reveal an 
object's true equipmental nature. 
This objection, however, is based upon the false assumption that 
equates the photographic image with the object itself, an assumption that 
simply disregards the creative freedom of the photographer. By placing 
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photographed objects in certain contexts and under certain lighting condi­
tions, the photographer also exercises the artistic freedom which allows him 
or her to capture the full equipmental nature ofequipment. A good example 
ofthis freedom is exhibited in Andr6 Kert6sz' s depiction ofa pipe (Kert6sz, 
Plate # 71). In the photograph, Kert6sz captures the simplicity and grace of 
the pipe's equipmental nature by placing it in a context which evokes in the 
mind ofthe observer the pipe's various uses. 'The glasses just below the pipe 
reveal the smoking of the pipe in a time of study or contemplation while the 
overtumedglassestotheleftrevealthecomfortaffordedbythepipeinatime 
of worry or distress. The careful positioning ofthe pipe in the bowl suggests 
the pipe as a status symbol, a sign of education and wealth and the source of 
pride in the mind of its owner. Thus, the photograph does not simply reveal 
an actuall y present pipe to the observer. Rather, the photograph, like Van 
Gogh's painting. captures the observer's imagination of the pipe in a myriad 
of uses and significations and consequently reveals the equipmental being 
of the pipe. 
Photography And Technology 
While Heidegger does not himself directly address the issue of 
photography. Michael Zimmerman argues that Heidegger believes photog­
raphy to be an expression of the false notion ofthe modern era that humans 
are the ultimate ground ofreality. Zimmerman claims that Heidegger chose 
the title "The Age of the World-Picture" with both film and photography in 
mind. In the modern age, Heidegger believes that humans, or what he calls 
"Dasein," view objects as being dependent upon themselves in order to 
exist. As Heidegger states, "What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a 
way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up 
by Dasein, who represents and sets forth" (HeideggerinZimmerman, p. 87). 
Accordingto Heidegger, instead of letting objects Be and experiencing them 
in their true sense, the modern outlook places humans within any world­
picture and consequently fails to recognize lhe fundamental ground of 
beings in Being. 
Zimmerman argues that Heidegger thinks that photography is an 
aspect of what Zimmerman calls "the technological drive to make every­
thing wholly present, unconcealed, available for use" (Zimmerman, p. 86). 
According to Zimmerman, the camera has a "point of view" which is, as 
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Zimmerman states, "the position taken on things for the purpose of making 
them reveal themselves in ways satisfactory to the one doing the re­
presenting" (Zimmerman, p. 87). Thus, Zimmerman claims that Heidegger 
believes photography to be the epitome of the modem mind-set The 
photographerpicks and chooses his orher reality as heor she sees fit. Reality 
is viewed as a ready-made object, and in deciding what to photograph, the 
photographer chooses which reality he or she should recreate. The reality 
presented in the photograph is thus dependent upon the photographer's 
discretion, and this subject-dependent view ofreality reflects the very mind­
set of modernity that wrongly assumes that human consciousness is the 
fundamental ground for the existence of other beings. Thus, according to 
Zimmerman, Heidegger argues that the subject-dependent perspective of 
photography ignores the truth that all beings, including Dasein, are ulti­
mately grounded in Being (Zimmerman, p. 87). 
Heidegger's argument, however, irOnically stems from the failure 
to view photography in light of Heidegger's own vision of technology} 
Heidegger believes that in the modern, technological age, Dasein has 
become estranged from its essence as the thatness ofBeing. Dasein views 
reality as a commodity at its disposal, and Heidegger refers to reality 
regarded as a commodity by the term "standing reserve." When reality is 
treated by Dasein as "standing reserve," Dasein sees the existence of reality 
as being dependent upon its own existence. Thus, as Heidegger states, in the 
current technological age, humans have lost touch with the truth that their 
essence is grounded in Being because "it seems as though [humans] 
everywhere and always encounter only [themselves]" (QCT, p. 308). 
The solution, for Heidegger, is not to forsake technology but rather 
to adopt a new mind-set towards technology. Dasein must realize that it is 
Being and not Dasein's own creative resourcefulness that is the ultimate 
driving force behind the emergence of technology. Rather than regarding 
"technology as an instrument" by which Dasein has ingeniously gained 
control over its environment, Heidegger believes that Dasein must view 
technology as "the destining of a revealing" (QCT, p. 314). Technology is 
destined by Being as a way in which Being reveals itself to Dasein. Only by 
conceiving technology in this way can Dasein transcend the anthropocentric 
3 By calling the argument against photography "Heidegger's argument," I am assuming 
that Zimmerman's presentation of Heidegger's views on photography is accurate. 
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view that it is the ultimate source of technology and that world is merely a 
ready-made "standing reserve" awaiting human conunand. With a different 
outlook toward technology, Dasein will retain its essence as grounded in 
Being without having to completely forsake the revealing of Being as well 
as the many practical benefits that technology provides. 
Paradoxically, if one applies this conception of technology to 
photography, Heidegger's argument that photography epitomizes the an­
thropocentric mind-set of the modem age appears misleading. By adopting 
Heidegger's notion that technology is the destined revealing of Being. the 
camera is no longer viewed as an aspect of human genius by which human 
beings have mastered the ability to re-create reality. Rather, the camera's 
ground in Being is recognized. The camera is viewed as being destined by 
Being to reveal Being. Seen in such a manner, the photograph is not the 
recreation of reality by human beings. On the contrary, the photograph, in 
its essence, is produced by Being in that it is destined by Being. It can not 
be denied that humans play a role in producing the camera as well as the 
photograph, and Heidegger does not ignore the fact that humans, or Dasein 
as the "thatness of Being," are essential for the revealing ofbeing to occur. 
However, Heidegger believes that Dasein and consequently the products of 
Dasein are ultimately grounded in Being. While it is true that a photographer 
selects the aspect of reality of which he or she takes a photograph, this 
selecting should not be equated with the creation of a reality. On the 
contrary, the selecting ofan object to photograph should be viewed as being 
similar to what occurs when a painter decides upon the subject ofhis or her 
painting. The photographer selects but does not create, and the distinction 
between the two concepts is critical in avoiding Heidegger's misconception 
about photography. 
Conclusion 
Many would agree that photography has had a profound impact on 
the history of painting, but probably few would recognize the fact that 
photography has in fact rendered painting obsolete as aform of art. Now that 
reality can be so effectively represented by the photograph. modern painting 
has begun exploring different and more abstract ways of representing' 
reality. Viewing art in the Heideggerian sense, one could argue that these 
new directions which painting has taken represent the confusion of painters 
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trying to salvage what remains of their archaic mode of representation now 
that its viability has been so completely shattered by the development of 
photography. Indeed, as Zimmerman indicates, Heidegger argues that 
modem painting in all of its concern with subjective interpretation is the 
unfortunate expression of the anthropocentric mind-set of the modern, 
technological era (Zimmerman, p. 237). What Heidegger does not seem to 
realize is that painting has not merely gone astray, but rather that it has been 
superseded by an art form which is far superior in its ability to capture the 
essence oftruth. Not only would a new conception of technology make this 
fact more obvious, but conversel y, through an understanding of the essence 
of photography as art, one may be making the first steps toward the new 
conception of technology that Heidegger believes to be so essential in 
Dasein's overcoming its estrangement from Being. 
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